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PV Supply Loosening Up?

The first signs came over the Summer when we heard rumours from suppliers that PV modules would be easier to come by in 2007. Now it's official. The PV module shortage is starting to ease a bit. Edwin Koot, founder of SolarPlaza, has a very nice summary of the trends that are contributing to this very welcome development. In short, Germany is slowing down, growth in other markets has slowed because of high prices, new silicon supply is coming online, manufacturing capacity has expanded, and Chinese manufacturers are entering the game in a big way.

CA "REC Taking" Redux

I was suprised to discover last week that the utilities are back at the table trying to take Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) from solar power system owners. Once again, their claim is that because they administer California's solar incentive payments, they should be granted ownership of the associated RECs.

Nevermind that the issue of REC ownership and DG incentives was decided on largely the same grounds over a year ago. As if taking a second swing at the issue wasn't already distasteful, the way they're going about it is ruffling some feathers. Rather than participating openly in the appropriate CSI or RPS proceedings, they went behind closed doors and made an intentional ex parte argument to some of the commissioners and staff.

The rumour is that the CPUC almost issued a ruling in favor of the utilities last Tuesday, but a quick intervention by solar advocates David Hochschild at PVNow and JP Ross at VoteSolar managed to put the brakes on. Rather than try to re-make their arguments myself, I'll just quote the key points from PVNow's letter:

  • This would slow California’s progress toward the 3000 MW goal.Solar RECs provide an essential incentive for solar customers, both those who require them to make a legal environmental claim about green energy for PR purposes etc. and those for whom the income or prospect of income provided by a solar REC sale can tip the balance in favor of investing in a solar energy system.
  • The CSI is considered an explicitly separate path from the RPS in the Climate Action Team’s Report. The CSI accounts for 3 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent in 2020. This amount of carbon emissions is in addition to the 33% RPS which yields 11 million metric tons in the same timeframe. Should the Commission decide to allow the CSI solar RECs to be donated to the utilities for their compliance with the RPS, this incremental 3 millions would be lost to the state.
  • Utilities have no claim to 100% of the solar RECs. Donating 100% of customer-generated solar RECs to the utilities is at odds with the fact that a solar investment is made by each of three principle parties (the customer, the state of California, the federal government via the tax credit). The federal government makes no claim to solar RECs, or any other form of RECs, regardless of federal renewable incentives. In fact, a number of government agencies buy green power products comprised of RECs supported by a number of federal incentive programs (http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/partners/top25.htm)
  • Ratepayers still benefit if customers own the solar RECs. Contrary to assertions from some utilities, ratepayers still benefit from customer ownership of solar RECs because the load reduction solar customers create reduces utilities renewable procurement obligations. Every MWh of load reduction reduces RPS procurement obligations by 33%. Furthermore, customer ownership of solar RECs will get us to the 3000MW goal faster and that means more locally produced solar RECS will be available for utilities to buy, and every subsequent watt installed after the 3000th MW reduces the RPS requirement for all utilities at no cost to ratepayers while contributing non-polluting peaking energy to the grid.
  • CA should treat REC ownership consistently across all generation sources. All generation sources receive federal and state incentives of various forms. But in other cases, an RPS participant must contract with the generator to buy the RECs. Customer-sited, solar energy should not be treated any differently.

Hopefully this is the last we'll hear about this issue! Well done, David & JP.


December 6 Postscript: The CPUC issued a draft decision today granting 100% ownership of RECs to renewable DG system owners. All's well that ends well.

SunPower Light?

Everyone's rushing to interpret the news that SunPower has agreed to acquire PowerLight (see Makower, Makower again, Fraser, and an insightful Dikeman). The deal has been rumoured for months now, so the announcement wasn't too much of a surprise. With the exception of Dikeman, who strikes a balanced-but-skeptical tone, most bloggers seem eager to buy the notion that this was a good move for SunPower. I'm not so sure.

The deal rationale goes something like this. As the silicon supply loosens, module prices will once again decline, and module manufacturers like SunPower will face margin erosion as their products are commodified. To regain pricing control, module manufacturers need to extend beyond components to innovate and build brands at the system level. System level innovation will be critical to squeezing cost out of the entire price equation so that solar can compete against retail rates without support from incentives. A vertically integrated company spanning ingot to installation is necessary to realizing this vision.

I agree with almost everything in the above paragraph with the exception of the last sentence. Module manufacturers will have to differentiate their products. System level innovation will be important, as will brands that stand for reliability, quality, and value in the customers' mind (particularly in the residential and small commercial market). Meaningful innovation will be driven by insights from frontline experience with PV applications and customer/installer needs.

Vertical integration is one way to assemble the resources to pursue this vision, but not the only way. It will come at some cost, so the move has to be seen as a big gamble with an uncertain outcome. The question to be answered is whether the gamble improves the companies' chances for success?

I think one of the biggest risks is that both companies will alienate partners that could have generated a lot of value for them. PowerLight only sources 20% of its modules from SunPower at this point, so 80% of their suppliers woke up this morning with big things to think about. I'm sure they'll all make positive public statements, but my experience tells me they're sharpening their daggers behind closed doors.

Conversely, SunPower has made some great progress developing a stable of integrators who are working hand-in-hand with the company to deliver SunPower-branded systems to market. I think all of those partners will now be wondering how committed the company is to their success now that they compete directly. And, no doubt, they'll feel somewhat betrayed having helped a supplier to build its brand with their customers. It's possible PowerLight and SunPower can dance their way through these issues, but there's no doubt it introduces some new downside scenarios for both companies.

Frankly, I've been a big fan of SunPower's market approach. Rather than chasing lowest-cost-per-watt, which is a sure path to commoditization, the company chose a high-efficiency, high-value positioning. Of all the module manufacturers, I think they had the best shot at establishing a well differentiated product with defensible margins. Did they need to add the management challenge of an integrator business to ehance their chances for success? I suppose because their product is more expensive per watt, they felt a need to squeeze more out BOS and install costs to ensure their product stayed competitive.

On a related note, I'm not sure SunPower's market position lines up well with the challenges of PowerLight's business. Certainly there are applications where limited rooftop space requires higher efficiency modules--and higher efficiency modules may translate to marginally lower BOS/install costs (less "trips up the ladder"). But there are also applications where lower efficiency modules provide the best cost-benefit and PowerLight will have to maintain supply of those modules to stay competitive in those market segments.

Finally, I'm not sure the system integration business is really a great place to be in the long term and SunPower paid a high price to get into it. I built a very successful system integrator business over the last 5 years and competed with PowerLight regularly--in fact our sales team was proud of the claim that we never lost a deal in competition to them. I actually saw that fact as a troubling warning sign, that the best-established player in the industry couldn't defend itself effectively from new entrants.

As solar power installs have become more common, I've seen more and more mechanical, roofing, and electrical contractors develop the skill sets necessary to provide good quality PV installations. And they're willing to do it for very thin margins compared to what today's systems integrators expect. Add to that the slowdown in the housing market that will only increase the supply of willing entrants and it really starts to get scary. To the extent that manufacturers take some of the mystery out of project engineering and provide "packaged systems" that anyone can install, I think system integrators are in a race to the bottom.

My gut is that there are partial integration strategies that have an equal or better chance of success in this market. I would have thought that SunPower could have leveraged its unique product and system branding to develop a robust distribution network, relying on capable installers with local market knowledge to give them concentrated regional power. It's possible they know something I don't--both companies have smart, experienced management teams and I wouldn't want to bet against them.

The bottom line is that I don't think this is a "game over" move...in fact I think it creates a wide opening for other smart companies to come up with alternative combinations that can potentially innovate faster and develop a more efficient distribution strategy.

The More Things Change

I should have titled this column "The Best Laid Plans" to describe the difference between where I thought I was going with my new venture and where I ended up.

My departure from Energy Innovations in June really couldn't have gone better. We made a very smooth transition to the new management team led by Andrew Beebe & Joe Benga, formerly head of projects at PowerLight. And I had the pleasure of going out on a very positive note, winning the largest ever US corporate PV project in a competitive bid for Google's business. We actually won the project in the early part of 2006, but were barred from disclosing the project until it was announced at the SolarPower 2006 event mid-October. It's an amazing project that really reflects the spirit and vision of the team at Google--I'm looking forward to seeing the project commissioned in 2007!

What happened after my departure was a bit less systematic. I had planned to take six months to work on several business ideas I had been kicking around and spend some time with my family.  I had also planned to blog a bit about the process of founding my next venture. Hah. No such luck.

There were three ideas I was looking at closely--one in consumer carbon emissions/neutrality, one in large scale carbon offset projects, and one in large scale solar project development. The solar developer idea is one I've been thinking about ever since I started Prevalent Power in 2001. For any number of reasons, mainstream solar is not going to happen according to the current model of selling multi-million dollar onsite solar power systems to big companies to own and operate themselves. That's a green-motivated, early adopter buying pattern that I believe will fade as the market grows.

For solar power to go mainstream, the risk of ownership has to be handled by someone much better equipped to make all of the the design, technology, construction, and operating choices. The capital has to come from sources that are well matched to the risk-return profile of a solar project. And, the end user has to be given a simplified business proposition--eg energy savings, green power, a price hedge--packaged as a service.

What wasn't as clear to me back in 2001 was how to overcome the business model hurdles to achieve the necessary scale. Over the last year however, I had been talking with some insightful guys--Don Hutchison, Allen Anderson, and Matt Garlinghouse--who had some innovative ideas about how build a scalable solar development business. Long story short, I found myself pitching the idea to some very supportive investors just two days after leaving Energy Innovations. A week or two later, we had the money and Recurrent Energy was born.

We're heads down building the team and preparing to launch our first series of projects next year--which is why I haven't posted anything since last Spring. I don't expect to post too much about the business--it turns out blogging about startups is a bit like blogging about a new romance, you don't necessarily want everyone knowing all the details! But as I find time, I expect to renew blogging about all the other things that are happening in the solar power and clean energy universe.

In any case, it feels nice to be back online talking about the topics that interest me. I look forward to getting back in touch with readers and hearing what you all think.